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Civil Procedure. Bailey v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co.,
788 A.2d 478 (R.I. 2002). A party may not be relieved of a final
judgment under rule 60(b)(6) for inexcusable neglect. Inexcusable
neglect precludes relief under rule 60(b)(1), which allows relief
only for "excusable neglect"; therefore, inexcusable neglect cannot
constitute the "other grounds" required for relief under rule
60(b)(6).
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging they suffered personal injuries
while they were excavating a trench and laying a gas line while
employed by Algonquin Gas Transmission Company.' Plaintiffs
alleged defendant, Maguire Group, Architects, Engineers, Planners, Ltd. (Maguire), knew or should have known the soil and
ground water that plaintiffs excavated was contaminated with
toxic chemicals. 2 Maguire filed an answer denying the
3
allegations.
During pretrial discovery, plaintiffs requested production of
several documents from Maguire, to which Maguire did not respond. 4 After Maguire failed to produce the documents requested,
a motion and order compelling Maguire to produce the documents
was issued, a conditional default order was also issued, default was
entered, there was a hearing on damages, and, finally, a default
judgment was entered in the amount of $458,533.69.5 All of the
court papers were properly served on Maguire's attorney, John
Coffey, Jr. (Coffey); however, Coffey failed to respond to any requests. 6 Coffey cited his wine consumption, which eventually led
to treatment for alcoholism, as the reason for his impaired judg7
ment in handling the case.
Following the execution on the judgment, Maguire engaged
new counsel and filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to
rule 60(b)(1) and (6) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure." The motion justice found that there was no
1. Bailey v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 788 A.2d 478, 480 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 479.
4. Id. at 480.
5. Id. at 479-80.

6. Id. at 480.
7. Id. at 481.
8. Id. at 480-81.
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causal connection between Coffey's alcoholism and his failure to
properly manage this case, citing the fact that Coffey had properly
managed many other legal matters during the same time period.9
The court concluded that Coffey's behavior was not excusable neglect under rule 60(b)(1), but rather it was unexplained or willful
conduct.' 0 The motion justice also denied relief under rule 60(b)(6)
reasoning that relief under rule 60(b)(6) must be mutually exclusive from relief under rule 60(b)(1)-(5). 1 1 He held that because Coffey's inexcusable neglect disqualified Maguire from relief under
rule 60(b)(1), it also disqualified Maguire from relief under rule
60(b)(6). 12 The trial court also found that there were no circumstances present that would result in a manifest injustice to the de3
fendant arising out of the default judgment.'
14
Due to the aforementioned reasons, the motion was denied.
Maguire appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, challenging
15
only the motion justice's findings with respect to rule 60(b)(6).
BACKGROUND

Rule 60(b) states the court may relieve a party of a final judgment or order for "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;.., or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the opera16
tion of the judgment."
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The court held that the fundamental law of agency imputes
the neglect of an attorney to his client; therefore, Coffey's failure to
respond was imputed to Maguire. 17 The court held that this concept remains unchanged regardless of whether the legal misconduct constituted "gross" negligence.' 8
9.

Id. at 481.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 482.
Id.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.

16.

R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 60.

17. Bailey, 788 A.2d at 485.
18. Id. The court addressed two exceptions as to when the law of agency does
not impute the neglect of an attorney to his client: when the client attempts to
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The supreme court responded to Maguire's challenge under
rule 60(b)(6) by affirming the motion justice's decision using the
same reasoning applied by the motion justice. 19 The court found
that the motion justice did not abuse his discretion by finding Coffey's negligence was inexcusable. 20 Therefore, Maguire was precluded from relief under rule 60(b)(1), which provides relief only for
"excusable neglect."2 1 The supreme court further reasoned the
same inexcusable neglect cannot be the "other grounds" required
for relief under rule 60(b)(6), unless other extraordinary factors
were also present, because rule 60(b)(6) was not intended as a
catchall. 22 The court was unable to find other extraordinary factors to justify relief under rule 60(b)(6); therefore, it denied
23
Maguire's motion to vacate the judgment.
CONCLUSION

The law of agency imputes the neglect of an attorney to his
client even if the misconduct of the attorney rises to the level of
gross negligence. A party may not be relieved of a final judgment
under rule 60(b)(6) for inexcusable neglect because the same inexcusable neglect that precludes relief under rule 60(b)(1) cannot
constitute the "other grounds" required for relief under Rule
60(b)(6).
Amy Hughes

sever the relationship with the attorney and when extraordinary circumstances
exist. Id. at 483.
19. Id. at 482-83.
20. Id. at 482.

21.

Id.

22.

Id. at 483.

23.

Id. at 483-84.
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Civil Procedure. Flynn v. Al-Amir, 811 A.2d 1146 (R.I. 2002).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a motion to vacate a
void judgment is not subject to the one-year deadline; service of
process on the defendant's last known address at his mother's
house was proper; and the exclusion of affidavits as inadmissible
hearsay was proper.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Kerri Ellen Flynn (Flynn) filed for divorce in November 1989
against Nicholas A-Amir (Al-Amir), her alleged common-law husband.' Pursuant to Family Court Rules of Procedure for Domestic
Relations, Flynn mailed the complaint to AI-Amir via certified mail
to his last known address in Massachusetts. 2 Even though she
knew he married a woman in California, Flynn believed Al-Amir
3
still lived in Massachusetts because he still visited and called her.
Al-Amir's mother received the complaint and signed it on behalf of
her son. 4 AI-Amir did not answer the complaint or appear in family court, and as a result final judgment was granted in July 1990. 5
The divorce decree granted Flynn child support for the minor child
of the alleged common-law marriage. 6 AI-Amir did make some
7
child support payments, but fell behind by thousands of dollars.
In May 2000, almost ten years later, AI-Amir filed a motion to
vacate the judgment on grounds of insufficient service of process.8
The family court held a hearing, which neither Al-Amir nor his
mother attended. 9 The court found that AI-Amir's contacts with
the state were sufficient for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him and that he failed to prove the service of process was
invalid. 10 In support of his motion, Al-Amir submitted affidavits
from himself and his mother, where he attacked the factual
grounds of his purported common-law marriage. 11 The family
1. Flynn v. A1-Amir, 811 A.2d 1146, 1148 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id. at 1149.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1149-50.
Id.

20031

SURVEY SECTION

court refused to allow Al-Amir's affidavits into evidence because
they were hearsay. 12 The court also ruled that Al-Amir had not
established that the one-year limitation for filing motions to vacate
judgments was inapplicable in this case. 13 Al-Amir's motion to va14
cate was denied.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Turning first to the issue of whether the one-year limitations
for filing the motion to vacate was applicable, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the one-year limitation was not applicable to motions to vacate where the judgment is void.' 5 The supreme court reasoned that time is inconsequential when
considering a void judgment because the judgment was never effective. 1 6 Furthermore, the court noted that it was the duty of the
court to remove the cloud of a void judgment whenever it was
brought to the court's attention regardless of the circumstances.17
In this instance, by alleging, in his motion to vacate, that service of
process was insufficient, Al-Amir gave the family court the basis to
consider the motion, as the failure of service of process would void
the judgment.' 8
Next, the supreme court considered whether the service of process was proper.' 9 The court held that service of process by certified mail to Al-Amir's last known address in Massachusetts was
proper. 20 Due process requires notice of the lawsuit be reasonably
calculated to afford the parties an opportunity to present their objections. 2 ' Service by registered mail with return receipt meets
this requirement because it normally guarantees the defendant, a
relative, or close associate has received notice of the pending suit. 2 2
In this case, Flynn's actions of sending the summons and complaint to A1-Amir's last known address and his mother's receipt of
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1150.
14. Id. at 1149.
15. Id. at 1150-51 (citing Lamarche v. Lamarche, 348 A.2d 22, 23 (R.I. 1975)).
16. Id. at 1150 n.3 (citing Lamarche, 348 A.2d at 23).
17. Id. (citing Lanarche, 348 A.2d at 23).
18. Id. at 1150-51.
19. Id. at 1151.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing Action Indus., Inc. v. Wiedeman, 346 A.2d 798, 804 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1975)).
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it, met the minimum requirements that a defendant be afforded
23
notice of the pending action.
Last, the court considered whether the family court's refusal
to consider AI-Amir's affidavits in deciding the motion to vacate,
was proper. 2 4 The court held that the family court's decision to
exclude the affidavits was not an abuse of discretion. 2 5 The family
court's reasons for excluding the affidavit were that Flynn would
be denied the right to cross-examine both Al-Amir and his mother
and that the fact-finder would be denied the right to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses. 2 6 Furthermore, Al-Amir implied in his
motion to vacate that he would make himself and his mother available to testify if required to do so. 2 7 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court noted the family court's rejection of the affidavits effectively
called upon Al-Amir and his mother to testify at the hearing if they
wanted to tell their side of the story. 28 The family court was entitled to doubt AI-Amir's affidavits because Al-Amir failed to make
himself available for cross-examination even though his affidavit
implied he would do so if required. 29 Therefore, the family court
30
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a motion to vacate
a void judgment is not subject to the one-year limitation, even ten
years after final judgment. Service of process by registered mail on
a close relative, such as defendant's mother at the defendant's last
known address was proper. The family court's decision to exclude
affidavits as hearsay was not an abuse of discretion where the defendant asserted he would make himself available to testify but did
not appear at the hearing.
Joshua A. Stockwell
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 1152.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Andrews v. Masse, 341 A.2d 30, 31 (R.I. 1975)).
Id. at 1153.
Id.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.
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Civil Procedure. Johnson v. Newport County Chapter for Retarded Citizens, 799 A.2d 289 (R.I. 2002). Where a plaintiff has
failed to file suit in a timely manner due to mental incapacity, statutes of limitation are subject to equitable tolling if the plaintiff is
shown to have been of unsound mind. Being of unsound mind is
defined as "the inability to manage one's day-to-day affairs."
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Richard Johnson (Johnson), an employee of the Newport
County Chapter for Retarded Citizens (Newport), alleged he was
sexually harassed by his supervisor.' Despite conversations with
his supervisor informing her that her comments and advances
were unwelcome and requesting this behavior cease, the harassing
behavior continued. 2 His request for assistance from management
also had no effect. 3 As a result of the harassment, Johnson began
to suffer severe distress and anxiety, depression, high blood pressure, and weight loss. 4 He was diagnosed with an anxiety disorder
and advised by his physician to take a leave of absence. 5 In spite of
advanced and aggressive mental health care, Johnson's condition
deteriorated. 6 He experienced intense agoraphobia, panic attacks,
and hair loss, and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
7
disorder.
On May 18, 1995, Johnson filed a claim of discrimination
against Newport with the Rhode Island Commission for Human
Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 8 The
Commission subsequently issued a "Notice of Right to Sue" on May
17, 1997. 9 Though Johnson eventually filed the action against
Newport, he did not do so within ninety days of the receipt of the
Notice,' 0 as required by section 28-5-24.1(b) of the Rhode Island
General Laws."
1.

Johnson v. Newport County Chapter for Retarded Citizens, 799 A.2d 289

(R.I. 2002).
2. Id. at 290.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing R.I. GEN LAws § 28-5-24.1(b) (2000)).
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Newport filed a motion for summary judgment for failure to
institute the claim in a timely manner. 12 In opposing the motion,
Johnson argued that the ninety-day provision should be tolled pursuant to the exception in section 9-1-19, for people of unsound
mind. 13 Johnson submitted an affidavit from his treating psychiatrist stating that during those ninety days, Johnson had attempted
suicide and suffered from extreme social phobias, blackouts, and
difficulty with memory.' 4 It was the psychiatrist's opinion that
during this time, Johnson's judgment was impaired to the extent
that he was unable to comprehend or exercise his right to undertake litigation in this, or any other, matter.' 5
The trial court held that section 9-1-19 was not available to
Johnson because section 9-1-24 made it inapplicable to actions limited by special time provisions.' 6 Holding that Johnson's causes of
action under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act and
the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990 were subject to the
ninety-day time limits pursuant to section 28-5-24.1(b),17 the trial
court granted Newport's motion for summary judgment.'
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

While upholding the trial court's determination that section 91-24 makes the tolling provisions of section 9-1-19 inapplicable in
this case, 19 the Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized equitable
tolling as an exception to the general statute of limitations. 20 The
court quoted the United States Supreme Court in Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs,2 1 which addressed equitable tolling and
noted it was "applicable to lawsuits against private employers
22
under Title VII."

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 290-91.
Id. at 291.
Id.
Id.
Id,
Id.
Id.
Id. at 292.
Id.
498 U.S. 89 (1990).

22. Johnson, 799 A.2d at 292 (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95).
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After citing other federal case law recognizing equitable tolling, 2 3 the Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected Newport's argument that these cases were not binding on the court because the
states are not required to follow federal decisions involving procedural requirements in Title VII cases. 2 4 The court held that the
availability of equitable tolling is outcome determinative and more
substantive than procedural in nature.25 Accordingly, the federal
26
authority was found to be binding on the court.
The court recognized equitable tolling as an available exception to the ninety-day provisions of section 28-5-24.1(b) for people
of unsound mind, 27 defining unsound mind as the inability to manage one's day-to-day affairs. 28 This standard had been previously
adopted by the court in defining the requirements of section 9-119,29 the provision that Johnson had originally tried to use. 30 The
court also stated that since exceptions to statutes of limitations are
strictly construed, an inability to manage one's day-to-day affairs
must be demonstrated by "objectively ascertainable actions or
inaction." 3 1
In remanding the case for a determination of whether Johnson
met the standard for unsound mind, the court noted that the attribution of an impaired condition to the actions of a defendant was a
factor relevant to the application of equitable principles, though
32
not a requirement.
CONCLUSION

In Johnson v. Newport County Chapter for Retarded Citizens,
Inc., the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that equitable tolling is
an exception to the general statute of limitations based on principles of equity and fairness, which is available to litigants who are
of unsound mind. The court defined the standard for unsound
23. Id. (citing Irwin v. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (citing
Zipes v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982))).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 293.
28. Id.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. (citing Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476 (R.I. 2002)).
Id. at 291.
Id.
Id.
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mind a the inability to manage one's day-to-day affairs, which
must be demonstrated by evidence of objectively ascertainable action or inaction.
Carolyn P. Medina
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Civil Procedure. Mottola v. Cirello, 789 A.2d 421 (R.I. 2002). A
state employee whose vehicle struck another was properly dismissed from suit where the employee was acting within the scope
of his employment and the claim did not arise out of fraud, misconduct, or actual malice by the employee. Also, the trial court may
not order the attorney general to defend such suit until the employee makes a written request and the attorney general declines
to engage independent counsel.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

While driving on June 18, 1997, Mark E. Cirello (employee),
an employee of the State of Rhode Island, struck Rudolph Mottola
(plaintiff) from the rear.' Mottola filed a complaint against the defendant on June 10, 1998, alleging negligence by both Cirello and
the state via respondeat superior.2 Prior to the collision, the state
had entered into an insurance contract with Royal Sun & Alliance
Insurance Company (Royal) that provided coverage for the state's
vehicles, including the vehicle driven by Cirello. 3 As part of the
coverage contract, the state was required to cooperate in the defense of any claims and allow the carrier discretion to both investi4
gate and settle claims.
After being served with the complaint, the attorney general
forwarded the claim to Royal for defense and coverage, after which
Royal retained the firm of Higgins, Cavanagh, & Cooney (Higgins)
to answer and defend the suit.5 Answering the complaint, Higgins
moved, pursuant to section 9-31-12(b) of the Rhode Island General
Laws, 6 to dismiss the claim against Cirello and substitute the state
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Mottola v. Cirello, 789 A.2d 421, 422 (R.I. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 423; R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-31-12 (1997) provides:

Indemnification-Reservation of obligation-Certification-(a) The state
reserves the right to determine whether or not it will indemnify any employees defended pursuant to §§ 9-31-8 - 9-31-11, if a judgment is rendered against the employee (b) Upon certification by the court in which
the tort action against a state employee is pending that (1) the defendant

employee was acting within the scope of his or her office or employment
when the claim arose, and (2) the claim does not arise out of actual fraud,
willful misconduct, or actual malice by the employee, any civil action or
proceeding commenced upon the claim under this statute shall be deemed
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as the party defendant.7 The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the claim against Cirello.8 The trial court also declared
sua sponte, that Mottola was no longer entitled to statutory interest on any potential judgment and that the statutory cap on damages pursuant to section 9-31-1 applied to any judgment plaintiff
might recover. 9 Finally, the trial court ordered that the "Attorney
General [shall] enter his appearance forthwith [and that] [ciounsel
for the defendant shall withdraw simultaneously." 10 The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted certiorari to review these interlocutory rulings. 1
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

First, reviewing Cirello's motions to dismiss the claim and
substitute the state as the party defendant, the court found the
statutory language of section 9-31-12(b) to be clear and unambiguous. 1 2 The court held that once the state stipulated that Cirello

was acting within the scope of his employment and that the suit
was not improperly motivated, the substitution of the state as
party defendant was appropriate, and Cirello was properly re3
moved from the case.'
Turning to the trial court's determination of counsel, the supreme court found that, although section 9-31-6 provided that in
an action "against the [Sitate of Rhode Island, the attorney general, or any assistant attorney general authorized by him or her,
shall represent the state in the action[,]" the statute did not preclude the state from entering into a contract that allowed an insurance carrier to provide a defense to claims made pursuant to the
policy. 14 The court reasoned that although section 9-31-8 allows
the attorney general to defend any action brought pursuant to the
statute "upon a written request of an employee or former employee
to be an action or proceeding brought against the state under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the state shall be substituted as the party defendant.
Id. (quoting R.I. GEN LAws § 9-31-12 (1997)).
7. Id. at 422.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 423.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 423-24.
13. Id. at 424.
14. Id. at 424 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-31-6 (1997)).
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of the state," section 9-31-9 recognizes that it may not be in the
best interests of the state for the attorney general to defend actions
in certain situations. 15 Furthermore, the court found that where
the attorney general concludes that it is not in the state's best interest to undertake a defense, section 9-31-11 requires the state to
pay reasonable counsel fees and the attorney general to consult in
advance with such counsel to discuss fee liability. 16 Accordingly,
the court found that, pursuant to section 9-31-10, the attorney general shall "assume exclusive control over the representation of the
employee or former state employee" only where there has been a
written request from the employee, and only after the attorney
general has declined to exercise his or her right to require the state
to retain independent counsel. 17 The court added that both sections 28-39-13 and 28-42-41 of the Rhode Island General Laws authorize the attorney general to delegate work to private counsel in
tort actions.18
Because there was no evidence that Cirello ever requested the
attorney general to defend in the suit, and the attorney general
had no obligation to undertake representation of the state until
Cirello was dismissed from the action, the court found the order to
be an abuse of discretion.' 9 The court held that it was not the
province of the superior court or the state's supreme court to dictate how the attorney general chooses to carry out his or her statutory functions. 20 Accordingly, the supreme court vacated both the
trial court's order of appearance to the attorney general and the
2
order directing defense counsel Higgins to withdraw. '
Lastly, the court found that although the applicability of the
statutory cap on damages provided in section 9-31-2 and the availability of prejudgment interest in the context of the case were both
captivating issues, they were not before the trial justice. 2 2 Thus,
the trial court's issuance of such orders constituted an abuse of
discretion.23
15. Id.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 425.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 425-26.
Id. at 426.
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The Dissenting Opinion
. Justice Flanders disagreed with the majority's decision to
quash the portion of the superior court's order requiring the attorney general to enter his appearance on behalf of the state, and dissented from this portion of the opinion. 2 4 He argued that section 931-6 is clear in requiring the attorney general to represent the
state in any suit brought against it under the Governmental Tort
Liability Act. 2 5 Justice Flanders did note, however, that he found

nothing in the law prohibiting the assistance of private counsel in
representing the state, but argued that complete abdication of the
attorney general's ultimate control and responsibility in such cases
26
was plainly prohibited.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held: 1) a state employee
whose vehicle struck another was properly dismissed from suit
brought by the other driver for personal injuries where the state
employee was acting within the scope of his employment and the
claim did not arise out of actual fraud, willful misconduct, or actual
malice by the state employee; 2) it was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion to order the attorney general to defend a personal injury
action resulting from a vehicular collision involving a state employee unless that employee had made a written request and the
attorney general declined to engage independent counsel; and 3) it
was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to order that the statutory prejudgment interest would not be available and that damages were capped in a motorist's suit against the state for injuries
received when struck by state employee-driven vehicle.
Nicholas R. Mancini

24.
25.
26.

Id. (Flanders, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 429.
Id.
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Civil Procedure. Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Masse, 799 A.2d 259
(R.I. 2002). A secured creditor who never filed an answer or challenged the validity of a tax sale of real estate owned by a debtor
after receiving notice of such sale is barred from doing so in a later
proceeding to set aside the sale, even if the sale was in violation of
the bankruptcy code's automatic stay provision. Additionally, an
appeal by a secured creditor is timely despite failure to appeal
from an order dismissing its complaint, given that the order directed that judgment "shall enter" for defendants and creditor filed
notice of appeal six days after the final judgment was subsequently
entered.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Defendant Christopher Robbins (debtor) executed a note in
favor of Norwest Mortgage, Inc. (Norwest) secured by a mortgage
on property in Cranston (City).' Robbins later filed a petition for
bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court, "triggering the
automatic stay of legal proceedings against him."2 While his petition was pending, the City sold Robbins's property at a tax sale to
Karolye White (White), and the bankruptcy court granted Norwest
relief from the automatic stay without foreclosing on the mortgage. 3 The bankruptcy court granted a discharge of debts and
closed the proceeding on April 15, 1998. 4 Later, White filed a petition to foreclose a tax lien on the property, giving notice to
Norwest, and on January 5, 1999, the superior court issued a final
decree that all rights of redemption be foreclosed and barred. 5
White then transferred his interest to Kevin Masse and K.B. Riccio
on January 12, 1999, and Norwest thereafter filed a complaint
seeking to set aside the original tax sale on the grounds that it was
void due to its consummation during the debtor's bankruptcy in
violation of the automatic stay.6
On May 8, 2000, the superior court denied Norwest's motion
for summary judgment, ruling that because Norwest was a non1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Masse, 799 A.2d 259, 260 (R.I. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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7
debtor third party, it had no standing to challenge the tax sale.
Following this decision, the court entered an order, providing in
part, that "judgment shall enter in this matter for the Defendants,
Kevin Masse, K.B. Riccio, Karolye White, and the City of Cranston ... ."8 After no final judgment entered upon this order,
Norwest sought to do so, while the defendants objected on the
grounds that the June 23 order constituted a final judgment in itself.9 The trial justice subsequently determined that no judgment
had been entered, and ordered the parties to submit to a final judgment, entered on November 15, 2000.10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Defendant filed two notices of appeal on November 21, 2000:
one was from the superior court's denial of its objection to the entry
of final judgment and the other from the entry of the final judgment.1 1 Norwest asserted that the June 23 order was "only an interlocutory order for which a separate judgment must enter before
any appeal can be filed." 1 2 In response, defendants asserted that

the June 23 order was a final judgment because "it was set forth on
a separate document and it terminates all the litigation between
the parties." 13 Because Norwest failed to file a notice of appeal until more than four months after the June 23 order, defendants argued that the appeal was untimely and should be summarily
dismissed. 14 Additionally, defendants contended that because an
appealable order was entered on June 23, 2000, there was no need
for the later final judgment to enter, and therefore, Norwest's appeal was untimely. 15
Addressing the propriety of the appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed with Norwest, holding that the docket sheet,
which indicated that judgment "shall enter" for defendants, did not
properly constitute a final judgment.' 6 Acknowledging that rule
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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58 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure
"does not prescribe what elements are essential to a judgment," nor
does it "demand any particular words or a peculiar formal act," the
court determined that the June 23, 2000 order, directing the later
entry of a final judgment, was, by its own terms, an interlocutory
order. 17 Finding that no final judgment entered until November
15, 2000, the court held that Norwest's appeal was timely and
properly before it.'1
Norwest next argued that the initial tax sale of the property
was void and in violation of the automatic stay provisions of 11
U.S.C. § 362(a), and that all proceedings flowing from the sale
were void. 19 They further asserted that the motion justice should
have vacated the final judgment in the foreclosure action and per20
mitted Norwest to pay the taxes and redeem the property.
Norwest relied on the court's ruling in Shackleton v. Coffee 'An Service, Inc. 21 that a "tax sale held during bankruptcy is void," 22 and

also contended that, as holder of a valid mortgage interest in the
property, it has standing to challenge the tax sale pursuant to
Soares v. Brockton Credit Union.23 Additionally, Norwest argued
24
that § 362(h) grants standing to both creditors and debtors.
Assuming that Norwest possessed standing to challenge the
validity of the tax sale, the court first followed Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams 2 5 in which the United States Supreme Court

held that "since a mortgagee clearly has a legally protected property interest, he is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale."2 6 Accordingly, the court found

that Norwest did receive notice of the sale and never filed an answer or challenge after receiving such notice. 27 The court then
found that pursuant to section 44-9-31 of the Rhode Island General
Laws, because Norwest never contested the tax title in response to
the notices it received to do so, it was "forever barred" from so do17. Id. at 261-62 (citing Malinov v. Kiernan, 251 A.2d 530, 531 (R.I. 1969)).

18. Id. at 262.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

657 A.2d 544 (R.I. 1995).
Norwest, 799 A.2d at 262 (citing Shackleton, 657 A.2d at 544).
Id.; Soares v. Brockton Credit Union, 107 F.3d 969 (1st Cir. 1997).
Norwest, 799 A.2d at 262.
462 U.S. 791 (1983).
Norwest, 799 A.2d at 262 (quoting Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798).

27. Id. at 263,
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ing in a later proceeding. 28 The court reasoned that Norwest's reliance on Soares was misplaced because in that case, it was a debtor,
and not a creditor, who was challenging the violation of an automatic stay. 2 9 Norwest's citation to Shackleton was similarly misplaced because that case "did not involve a secured creditor who
sought to challenge a tax sale after failing to comply with section
44-9-31."3o
CONCLUSION

An appeal by a secured creditor is timely despite failure to appeal from an order directing that judgment "shall enter" for defendants, and creditor filed notice of appeal six days after the final
judgment was later entered. Additionally, a secured creditor who
never filed an answer or challenged the validity of a tax sale of real
estate owned by a debtor after receiving notice of such sale is
barred from doing so in a later proceeding to set aside the sale,
even if the sale was in violation of the bankruptcy code's automatic
stay provision.
Nicholas R. Mancini

28. Id. Section 44-9-31 reads, in part, that when contesting the validity of a
tax sale, "the person shall do so by answer filed in the proceeding on or before the
return day or else be forever barred from contesting or raising the question in any
other proceeding." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-9-31 (1999).
29. Norwest, 799 A.2d at 263.
30. Id.
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Civil Procedure. Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476 (R.I. 2002). For
the first time the Rhode Island Supreme Court defined the term
"unsound mind" outside the context of repressed recollections. A
person has an unsound mind for purposes of tolling the statute of
limitations when that person cannot "manage his or her day-to-day
affairs." Also, a repressed memory must be completely concealed
and then suddenly and completely dislodged in order for tolling to
apply.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Joseph Roe, 1 a twenty-three year old man, sued multiple defendants for physical, emotional, and sexual abuse he was allegedly subjected to while a ward of the State of Rhode Island at the
Saint Aloysius Home. 2 The defendants moved for a motion to dismiss on the ground that Mr. Roe's action was time barred by the
three-year statute of limitations on personal injury claims. 3 In response, Mr. Roe claimed his minority tolled the statute of limitations. 4 Further, Mr. Roe claimed that the memories of abuse had
been so painful that for some time in the three years preceding the
filing of his suit he was not able to cope with them and thus could
not bring his suit.5 This, he claimed, acted as an "unsound mind"
disability within the meaning of section 9-1-19 of the Rhode Island
General Laws and tolled the statute of limitations until he could
file his suit.6 The motion justice considered materials outside the
pleadings and, therefore, his denial of Mr. Roe's claim operated as
a summary judgment, holding Mr. Roe's claim of unsound mind
failed to satisfy the strictures of section 9-1-19. 7 Mr. Roe appealed
this judgment, arguing that his intermittent inability to cope with
the memories of abuse should be sufficient to allow an unsound
mind tolling of the statute of limitations.8
1. The court permitted the plaintiff to proceed anonymously as Joseph Roe.
Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476, 479 n.2 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id. at 479.
3. Id. at 480.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 480-81.
Id. at 480.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

After a brief discussion the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that Mr. Roe could not avail himself of tolling based on minority
and went on to examine what a "repressed memory" should be. 9
The court decided that the vacillating nature of Mr. Roe's inability
to cope with his memories took his disability outside of the definition of repressed memory.' 0 Instead the court held that a repressed memory must be a memory that is completely concealed
and then suddenly and completely dislodged from its hiding
place."
12
Next the court turned to the "unsound mind" tolling claim.
In deciding Joseph Roe's claim, the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
for the first time outside the realm of repressed recollection, defined the term "unsound mind." 13 To reach its definition the court
traced the history of the unsound mind doctrine. 14 Initially the
court noted that the term had been used interchangeably with "legal incompetence" and had often been compared to the term "insanity."15 These terms are, according to the court, meant to
6
"denote a mental infirmity that vitiates legal capacity generally."'
The court also stated that an unsound mind must disable a person
to a "substantial degree" before that individual can claim to have a
legal disability. 1 7 Seeking to craft a definition that was consonant
with this history, the court held that a person has an unsound
mind when he or she has an "inability to manage [his or her] dayto-day affairs. " '
Finally the court applied its new definition of unsound mind to
Mr. Roe's case. 19 The court agreed with the decision of the motion
justice that Mr. Roe's adroitly slipping in and out of the criminal
justice system, his passing a Social Security exam intended to test
the mettle of his mental well-being, and his pursuance of the very
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 482-84.
at 484.

at 485 n.7.
(citing Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 879 (R.I. 1996)).
at 486 (citing Sosik v. Conlon, 164 A.2d 696, 698 (R.I. 1996)).

at 487.
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tort action at bar tended to show that the unsound mind provision
should not apply. 20 Lastly, the court held that the evidence of Mr.
Roe's "functional abilities" suggested that, regardless of his psychiatric problems, he had been oriented as to "time, place and person"
within his adult life and as such was able to manage his day-to-day
affairs. 2 1 With both the repressed memory and unsound mind
claims failing, the court affirmed the motion justice's ruling and
22
denied Joseph Roe relief.
CONCLUSION

A person will not be found to be of an unsound mind if he or
she can handle day-to-day affairs. Factors, which may be taken
into consideration in this judgment, can range from evidence of
passed mental exams to the ability to bring a lawsuit. In this case
the court decided that Joseph Roe was able to meet his day-to-day
requirements and as such he was of a sound mind, despite his having to deal with painful memories of sexual abuse. This being established, the statute of limitations could not be tolled and Mr.
Roe's action was time-barred.
Mark Ted Romley

20.
21.

Id. at 487-88.
Id.

22.

Id.
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Civil Procedure. Sweet v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc.,
795 A.2d 524 (R.I. 2002). A trial justice commits a clear abuse of
discretion when he or she excludes videotaped evidence that directly contradicts a plaintiffs claim.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On October 11, 1991, Ralph Sweet (Sweet) went to Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc., (Pace) to purchase supplies for a construction project.' While there, a forklift hit Sweet causing him to
sustain numerous injuries. 2 In October 1994, Sweet filed suit
against multiple defendants including Pace. 3 Pace conceded liabil4
ity and the case proceeded to trial on the sole issue of damages.
At trial, Sweet sought damages of $370,000 for pain and suffering, lost income, and medical expenses.5 Sweet testified at trial
that he was unable, because of the accident, to undertake numerous physical activities and that he presently suffered from neck
and back pain. 6 Sweet also testified that he was unable to take on
several profitable contracting jobs because of his injuries. 7 Sweet
speculated that his lost income from these jobs was approximately
$130,000.8
During the trial, Pace sought to introduce videotaped evidence
of Sweet. 9 The videotape showed Sweet driving an all terrain vehicle over bumpy roads in the national forest located in Arizona. 10
Pace also sought to introduce a videotaped deposition of Sweet's
stepdaughter." This deposition disclosed that Sweet partook in
strenuous physical family activities on several occasions after November 25, 131997.12 The trial justice allowed the evidence to be
introduced.
1. Sweet v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc., 795 A.2d 524, 524 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id. at 526.
3. Id.
4. Id.

5.

Id.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 527.
Id.

11.

Id.

12.

Id.

13.

Id.

2003]

SURVEY SECTION

469

Sweet subsequently amended his claim for damages to cover
only the period from October 11, 1991 to November 25, 1997.14 As
a result, the trial justice then excluded all of the videotaped evidence because the evidence was not relevant to Sweet's time period
for damages.' 5 The trial justice also disallowed the use of the vide6
otaped evidence for impeachment purposes.'
Pace then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law on
Sweet's claim for lost income. 17 The judge denied the motion because he did not want to take the case from the jury.' 8 The jury
awarded Sweet damages plus interest in an amount over
$300,000.19 Pace then renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law on Sweet's claim for lost income and made a motion for a
new trial.20 After the trial justice denied these motions, Pace
1
appealed. 2
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Exclusion of Evidence
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that the evidentiary
rulings made by a trial justice will not be overturned absent a clear
abuse of discretion. 22 The "abuse of discretion standard includes
review to ensure that the discretion was not guided by erroneous
legal conclusions."23

The court reviewed the standard for admitting relevant evidence and held that the trial justice's exclusion of the videotaped
evidence constituted an abuse of discretion. 24 The court noted
Sweet was claiming "severe and permanent injury" and the videotaped evidence would definitely go to show a lower probability that
25
Sweet was actually permanently injured because of the accident.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. (citing Votolato v. Mevandi, 747 A.2d 455, 460 (R.I. 2000) (quoting
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996))).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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The court also noted that Sweet testified to the fact that he
still, to the day of trial, was unable to undertake certain physical
activities. 26 Because this testimony was in direct contradiction of
what was on the videotapes, the court held that the videotapes
should have been admitted for impeachment purposes. 27 Based on
the evidentiary errors, the court ordered a new trial be held. 28

The Claim for Lost Income
The supreme court also reversed the trial justice's decision denying Pace's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Sweet's
claim for lost income. 29 The supreme court held that the basis of
30
the award for lost income was too speculative.
The court stated that lost income may only be awarded when
the loss is established with "reasonable certainty." 3 1 In the case at
bar, the only evidence offered to prove lost income was Sweet's testimony. 32 The court found this testimony to be based entirely upon
speculation and conjecture. 33 Because the evidence with respect to
the lost income was so speculative, the supreme court reversed the
34
decision of the trial justice and remanded the case for a new trial.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice's
refusal to admit the videotaped evidence of Sweet's physical activities constituted an abuse of discretion because Sweet was requesting damages for permanent injuries. The court also held that
Sweet's testimony as to the amount of his lost income, without
more, was too speculative to sustain a claim for lost income.
Charles M. Edgar Jr.
26. Id. at 528.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id
30. Id. at 529.
31. Id. (quoting UST Corp. v. General Road Trucking Corp., 783 A.2d 931, 941
(R.I. 2001)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 530.
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Civil Procedure. Wilkinson v. State Crime Laboratory Commission, 788 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 2002). Supplying the court with a brief
that does not include a meaningful discussion of the issues raised
constitutes a waiver of those issues. Achieving "full status" under
the merit system constitutes a protected property interest that
cannot be deprived without due process and just compensation.
The court is the sole determiner of whether a statement contains a
defamatory meaning.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Richard Wilkinson, a classified "full status"1 state crime laboratory employee, sued the state crime laboratory commission and
the director of the state's crime laboratory (crime lab) for wrongful
discharge, contempt, and back pay with benefits. 2 Wilkinson also
sued Louis Luzzi, the dean of the Pharmacy Department of University of Rhode Island (URI) and Dennis Hilliard, the director of the
crime lab, for defamation. 3 On appeal, Wilkinson raised numerous
arguments in his brief to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 4 The
court noted that Wilkinson raised twelve separate specifications of
error on appeal and failed to discuss the majority of them in his
brief. 5 They considered this deficiency to constitute a waiver of
6
certain issues.
The court, however, did address whether Wilkinson had a7
property interest in his employment protected by due process.
The court also analyzed whether certain 1994 amendments to the
State Crime Laboratory Commission Act" (crime lab act) deprived
Wilkinson of any property interest he may have possessed in his
employment. 9
In 1971, Wilkinson was employed as a criminalist for the State
of Rhode Island at the Laboratories for Scientific Criminal Investi1. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-4-59 (2002) (defining "full status" as tenure in
state service).
2. Wilkinson v. State Crime Lab. Comm'n, 788 A.2d 1129, 1131 (R.I. 2002).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1131 n.1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1131.
8. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-1.2-6 (2002).
9. Wilkinson, 788 A.2d at 1132.
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gation. 10 In July 1988, Wilkinson achieved "full status" under the
state's merit system. 11 Becoming a "full status" employee provides
tenure to state employees who have achieved twenty years of ser12
vice credit.
On January 8, 1992, Louis Luzzi, the dean of URI's Pharmacy
Department and executive secretary to the State Crime Laboratory
Commission, sent a letter to Wilkinson notifying him that he was
13 Wilfired for his alleged insubordination to Luzzi and to URI.
kinson was later reinstated after the commission received an advi4
sory opinion on the matter from the attorney general's office.'
Wilkinson was not reinstated, however, to his former position of
assistant director but to the lower position of criminalist.15 Wilkinson, unhappy with his reinstatement, filed a lawsuit in superior
court. 16

Later in 1994, the general assembly amended the crime lab
and changed all commission jobs at the crime lab to limited
appointment positions of the board of governors for higher education.' 8 The amendment made the commission jobs subject to the
employment policies and practices as set by the board of governors
for higher education and URI. 19 In 1996, the commission again
terminated Wilkinson from his employment at the crime lab by refusing to reappoint him. 20 Wilkinson subsequently amended his
21
complaint to challenge the termination.
act' 7

On a motion for summary judgment, the motion justice decided that the 1994 amendment to the crime lab act divested Wilkinson of his tenure and allowed him to be terminated without
22
cause when his appointment expired.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1132 n.4.
Id. at 1133.
Id.
Id. at 1134.
Id.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-1.2-6 (2002).
Wilkinson, 788 A.2d at 1134.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Failureto Brief
Addressing the issue of Wilkinson's failure to thoroughly brief
all the issues he raised on appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
stated that simply listing an issue for appellate review, without
devoting any portion of the brief to a meaningful discussion does
not assist the court and constitutes a waiver of that issue. 2 3 The
court supported its decision by citing O'Rourke v. Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island,24 which held that a plaintiffs failure
to present legal authorities and to argue an asserted error of the
trial court in their legal brief constituted a waiver of that legal error.2 5 In total, the court dismissed seven of the twelve assignments of error Wilkinson raised on appeal because he inadequately
26
briefed the issues for the court.
Due Process and the Effect of the 1994 Amendment
The supreme court did review the issue of whether Wilkinson
possessed a protected property interest in his employment and
whether an amendment to a statute, which conveyed that property
interest, in any way affected that interest. 2 7 With respect to the
issue of whether Wilkinson possessed a protected property interest
in his employment, the court held that "full status" state employees do possess a protected property interest in their employment
and are entitled to due process and just compensation protections
against any attempted termination. 28 The court noted that the
achievement of permanent classified status conveyed on Wilkinson
is a right to continued employment. 29 This right represents a
property interest protected by due process. 30 The court supported
this decision by relying on two United States Supreme Court cases
that held a state statute can confer a property right on government
23. Id. at 1131 n.1.
24. 478 A.2d 195, 198 n.4 (R.I. 1984).
25. Wilkinson, 788 A.2d at 1131 n.1.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1135.
28. Id. at 1138.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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employees. 31 Thus, the ultimate decision of the court was that because Wilkinson had a vested property right in his employment
after twenty years of service his employment was protected by the
32
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
With respect to the commission's contention that the 1994
amendment altered Wilkinson's "full status" classification, the supreme court held that Wilkinson's status was not affected by the
1994 amendment. 33 The court concluded that the legislature did
not intend the amendment to have a retroactive application and
thus had no effect on the status of those who attained "full status"
employment under the Merit System Act at the time of the amendment.3 4 The court stated that Wilkinson achieved this status in
1988 when he reached the twenty years of service mark and simultaneously obtained a protected property interest in his continued
employment. 3 5 Therefore, due process required that before the
state could divest him of his property interest just compensation
36
was required.
The Defamation Claims
The court also addressed the defamation claims Wilkinson
brought against Luzzi and Hilliard. 3 7 The alleged defamatory
statements were contained in a memoranda sent to Wilkinson by
Luzzi. 38 Hilliard allegedly made statements that were similar to

those in the memoranda to the commission. 3 9 The court reaffirmed its holding in Swerdlick v. Koch, 40 stating that a defamatory statement consists of words that are false and malicious,
imputing conduct which injuriously affects a person's reputation,
or that tend to degrade a person to the level of public hatred and
contempt. 4 1 The court noted that it alone decides whether the
31. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that property is not limited to technical forms, but encompasses a broader definition)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1140.
34. Id. at 1141 (citing Merit System Act R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-4-59 (1988)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1142.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 721 A.2d 849, 859 (R.I. 1998).
41. Wilkinson, 788 A.2d at 1142.
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statement contains a defamatory meaning. 4 2 The supreme court
held that the statements were not defamatory as a matter of law
because Luzzi and Hilliard manifested a good faith belief, based on
the facts and circumstances, that their statements were substan43
tially true.
CONCLUSION

Wilkinson's failure to devote any portion of his brief to a meaningful discussion of certain issues he raised on appeal constituted a
waiver of any assignment of error that may have existed in those
issues. On the other issues raised, the supreme court held that an
individual who attained his "full status" certification under the
merit system prior to the 1994 amendment is entitled to due process and just compensation protections because that person's employment represents a protected property interest. In addition, the
supreme court held that a defamatory statement consists of words
that are false and malicious, imputing conduct which injuriously
affects a person's reputation, or which tend to degrade someone
into public hatred and contempt and that the court alone is to decide whether the statement has a defamatory meaning.
Charles M. Edgar Jr.

42. Id.
43. Id. at 1143.

